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Abstract. Predicate intuitionistic logic is a well established fragment
of dependent types. According to the Curry-Howard isomorphism proof
construction in the logic corresponds well to synthesis of a program the
type of which is a given formula. We present a model of automata that
can handle proof construction in full intuitionistic first-order logic. The
automata are constructed in such a way that any successful run corre-
sponds directly to a normal proof in the logic. This makes it possible
to discuss formal languages of proofs or programs, the closure proper-
ties of the automata and their connections with the traditional logical
connectives.
1 Introduction
Investigations in automata theory lead to abstraction of algorithmic processes
of various kinds. This enables analysis of their strength both in terms of their
expressibility (i.e. answer questions on which problems can be solved with their
help) and in terms of resources they consume (i.e. time or space). They also make
it possible to shed a different light on the original problem (e.g. the linguistic
problem of languages generated by grammars can be reduced to the analysis
of pushdown automata) which makes it possible to conduct analysis that was
not possible before. In addition, the automata become a particular compact
data structure that can in itself, when defined formally, be subject to further
computations, as finite or pushdown automata are in automata theory.
Typically, design of automata requires extraction of finite control over the
process of interest. This is not always immediate in λ-calculi as λ-terms can con-
tain bound variables from an infinite set. One possibility here consist in restrict-
ing the programming language so that there is no need to introduce binders. This
method was used in the work of Düdder et al [3], which was enough to synthesise
λ-terms that were programs in a simple but expressive functional language.
Another approach would be to restrict the program search to programs
in total discharge form. In programs of this form, one needs to keep track of
types of available library calls, but not of the call names themselves. This idea
was explored by Takahashi et al [10] who defined context-free grammars that
can be used for proof search in propositional intuitionistic logic, which is, by
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Curry-Howard isomorphism, equivalent to program search in the simply typed
λ-calculus. Actually, the grammars can be viewed as performing program search
by means of tree automata due to known correspondence between grammars and
tree automata. However, the limitation to total discharge form can be avoided
with help of the technique developed by Schubert, Dekkers and Barendregt [7].
A different approach to abstract machinery behind program search process
was proposed by Broda and Damas [2] who developed a formula-tree proof
method. This technique provides a realisation of the proof search procedure
for a particular propositional formula as a data structure, which can be further
subject to algorithmic manipulation.
In addition to these investigations for intuitionistic propositional logic there
was a proposal to apply automata theoretic notions to proof search in first-
order logic [6]. The paper characterises a class of proofs in intuitionistic first-
order logic with so called tree automata with global equalities and disequalities
(TAGED) [4]. The characterisation makes it possible to recognise proofs that are
not necessarily in normal form, but is also limited to certain class of tautologies
(as the emptiness problem for the automata is decidable).
In this paper we propose an automata theoretical abstraction of the proving
process in full intuitionistic first-order logic. Its advantages can be best expressed
in terms in which implicit, but crucial, features of proof search become explicit.
In our automata the following elements of the proving process are exposed.
– The finite control of the proving process is made explicit.
– A binary internal structure of the control is explicated where one component
corresponds to a subformula of the original formula and one to the internal
operations that should be done to handle the proof part relevant for the
subformula. As a by-product of this formulation it becomes aparent how
crucial role the subformula property plays in the proving process.
– The resource that serves to represent eigenvariables that occur in the process
is distinguished. This abstraction is important as the variables play crucial
role in complexity results concerning the logic [9,8].
– The automata enable the possibility of getting rid of the particular syntac-
tical form of formulas and instead work on more abstract structures.
– The definition of automaton distils the basic instructions necessary to con-
duct the proof process, which brings into the view more elementary opera-
tions the proving process depends on.
Although the work is formulated in terms of logic, it can be viewed as synthesis
of programs in a restricted class of dependently typed functional programs.
Organisation of the paper We fix the notation and present intuitionistic first-
order logic in Section 2. Next, we define our automata in Section 3. We summarise
the account in Section 4.
2 Preliminaries
We need to fix the notation and present the basic facts about intuitionistic first-
order logic. The notation A ⇀ B is used to denote the type of partial functions
from A to B. We write dom(w) for the domain of the function w : A ⇀ B. For
two partial functions w,w′ we define w ⊕ w′ = w ∪ {〈x, y〉 ∈ w′ | x 6∈ dom(w)}.
The set of all subsets of a set A is P (A).
A prefix closed set of strings N∗ over N is called a carrier of a tree. A tree is a
tuple 〈A,≤, L, l〉 where A is a carrier of the tree, ≤ is the prefix order on N∗, the
set L is the set of labels and l : A → L is the labelling function. Whenever the
set of labels and the labelling function are clear from the context, we abbreviate
the quadruple to the tuple 〈A,≤〉. Since the formula notation makes it easy, we
sometimes use a subtree ϕ of A to actually denote a node in A at which ϕ starts.
2.1 Intuitionistic First-Order Logic
The basis for our study is the first-order intuitionistic logic (for more details see
e.g. the work of Urzyczyn, [11]). We assume that we have a set of predicates P
that can be used to form atomic formulae and an infinite set X1 of first-order
variables, usually noted as X,Y, Z etc. with possible annotations. Each element
P of P has an arity, denoted arity(P). The formulae of the system are:
ϕ,ψ ::= P(X1, . . . , Xn) | ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 | ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 | ϕ1 → ϕ2 | ∀X.ϕ | ∃X.ϕ | ⊥
where P is an n-ary predicate and X,X1, . . . , Xn ∈ X1. We follow Prawitz and
introduce negation as a notation defined ¬ϕ = ϕ → ⊥. A formula of the form
P(X1, . . . , Xn) is called an atom. A pseudo-atom formula is a formula of one of
the three forms: atom formula, a formula of the form ∃X.ϕ, or a formula of the
form ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2. We do not include parentheses in the grammar since we actually
understand the formulas as abstract syntax trees instead of strings. The tree is
traditionally labelled with the cases of the above mentioned grammar. We assume
that for a given case in the grammar the corresponding node of the tree has as
many sons as there are non-terminal symbols in the case. In addition, we use in
writing traditional disambiguation conventions for ∧,∨ and insert parentheses to
further disambiguate whenever this is necessary. The connective→ is understood
as right-associative so that ϕ1 → ϕ2 → ϕ3 is equivalent to ϕ1 → (ϕ2 → ϕ3). In
a formula ϕ = ϕ1 → · · · → ϕn → ϕ′, where ϕ′ is a pseudo-atom, the formula ϕ′
is called target of ϕ. In case ϕ′ = ∃X.ϕ′′, we call it existential target of ϕ.
The set of free first-order variables in a formula ϕ, written FV1(ϕ), is
– FV1(P(X1, . . . , Xn)) = {X1, . . . , Xn},
– FV1(ϕ1 ∗ ϕ2) = FV1(ϕ1) ∪ FV1(ϕ2) where ∗ ∈ {∧,∨,→},
– FV1(QX.ϕ) = FV1(ϕ)\{X} where Q ∈ {∃,∀},
– FV1(⊥) = ∅.
Other variables that occur in a formula are bound. Terms that differ only in
renaming of bound variables are α-equivalent and we do not distinguish be-
tween them. To describe the binding structure of a formula we use a spe-
cial bind operation. Let us assume that a formula ϕ has no free variables (i.e.
FV1(ϕ) = ∅) and let ψ be its subformula together with a variable X free in
ψ. We define bindϕ(ψ,X) as the subformula of ϕ that binds the free occur-
rences of X in ψ, i.e. the subformula ϕ′ of ϕ such that each its proper sub-
formula ψ′′ that contains ψ as a subformula has X ∈ FV(ψ′′). For instance
bind⊥→∃X.⊥→P (X)(P (X), X) = ∃X.⊥ → P (X).
Γ, x :ϕ ` x : ϕ (var)
Γ `M1 : ϕ1 Γ `M2 : ϕ2
Γ ` 〈M1,M2〉 : ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 (∧I)
Γ `M : ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2
Γ ` pi1M : ϕ1 (∧E1)
Γ `M : ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2
Γ ` pi2M : ϕ2 (∧E2)
Γ `M : ϕ1
Γ ` in1ϕ1∨ϕ2 M : ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2
(∨I1) Γ `M : ϕ2
Γ ` in2ϕ1∨ϕ2 M : ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2
(∨I1)
Γ `M : ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 Γ, x : ϕ1 ` N1 : ϕ Γ, y : ϕ2 ` N2 : ϕ
Γ ` case M of [x : ϕ1]N1, [y : ϕ2]N2 : ϕ (∨E)
Γ, x :ϕ1 `M : ϕ2
Γ ` λx : ϕ1.M : ϕ1 → ϕ2 (→ I)
Γ `M1 : ϕ1 → ϕ2 Γ `M2 : ϕ1
Γ `M1M2 : ϕ2 (→ E)
Γ `M : ϕ
Γ ` λXM : ∀X.ϕ (∀I)
∗ Γ `M : ∀X.ϕ
Γ `MY : ϕ[X := Y ] (∀E)
∗
Γ `M : ϕ[X := Y ]
Γ `packM,Y to ∃X.ϕ : ∃X.ϕ (∃I)
Γ `M1 : ∃X.ϕ Γ, x :ϕ `M2 : ψ
Γ ` let x :ϕ be M1 :∃X.ϕ in M2 : ψ (∃E)
∗
Γ `M : ⊥
Γ ` ⊥ϕM : ϕ (⊥E)
∗ Under the eigenvariable condition X 6∈ FV (Γ, ψ).
Fig. 1. The rules of the intuitionistic first-order logic
For the definition of proof terms we assume that there is an infinite set of
proof term variables Xp, usually noted as x, y, z etc. with possible annotations.
These can be used to form the following terms.
M,N ::= x | 〈M1,M2〉 | pi1M | pi2M |
in1ϕ1∨ϕ2 M | in2ϕ1∨ϕ2 M | case M of [x : ϕ1]N1, [y : ϕ2]N2 |
λx : ϕ.M |M1M2 | λXM |MX |
pack M, Y to ∃X.ϕ | let x : ϕ be M1 : ∃X.ϕ in M2 | ⊥ϕM
where x is a proof term variable, ϕ,ϕ1, ϕ2 are first-order formulas and X,Y
are first-order variables. Due to Curry-Howard isomorphism the proof terms can
serve as programs in a functional programming language. Their operational se-
mantics is given in terms of reductions. Their full exposition can be found in
the work of de Groote [5]. We omit it here, but give an intuitive account of
the meaning of the terms. In particular, 〈M1,M2〉 represents the product ag-
gregation construct and piiM for i = 1, 2 decomposition of the aggregation by
means of projections. The terms in1ϕ1∨ϕ2 M , in2ϕ1∨ϕ2 M reinterpret the value
of M as one in type ϕ1∨ϕ2. At the same time case M of [x : ϕ1]N1, [y : ϕ2]N2
construct offers the possibility to make case analysis of a value in an ∨-type.
This construct is available in functional programming languages in a more gen-
eral form of algebraic types. The terms λx : ϕ.M , M1M2 represent traditional
function abstraction and application. The proof terms that represent universal
quantifier manipulation make it possible to parametrise type with a particular
value λXM and use the parametrised term for a particular case MX. At last
pack M, Y to ∃X.ϕ makes it possible to hide behind a variable X an actual
realisation of a construction that uses another individual variable Y . The ab-
straction obtained in this way can be used using let x : ϕ be M1 : ∃X.ϕ in M2.
At last the term ⊥ϕM corresponds to the break instruction.
The environments (Γ,∆ etc. with possible annotations) in the proving system
are finite sets of pairs x : ψ that assign formulas to proof variables. We write
Γ `M : A to express that the judgement is indeed derivable. The inference rules
of the logic are presented in Fig. 1. We have now two kinds of free variables,
namely free proof term variables and free first-order variables. The set of free
term variables is defined inductively as follows
– FV(x) = {x},
– FV(〈M1,M2〉) = FV(M1M2) = FV(M1) ∪ FV(M2),
– FV(pi1M) = FV(pi2M) = FV(in1ϕ1∨ϕ2 M) = FV(in2ϕ1∨ϕ2 M) =
FV(λXM) = FV(MX) = FV(pack M, Y to ∃X.ϕ) = FV(⊥ϕM) =
FV(M),
– FV(case M of [x : ϕ1]N1, [y : ϕ2]N2) =
FV(M) ∪ (FV(N1)\{x}) ∪ (FV(N2)\y),
– FV(λx : ϕ.M) = FV(X)\{x},
– FV(let x : ϕ be M1 : ∃X.ϕ in M2) = FV(M1) ∪ (FV(M2)\{x}).
Again, the terms that differ only in names of bound term variables are considered
α-equivalent and are not distinguished by us. Note that we can use the notation
FV1(M) to refer to all free type variables that occur inM . This set is defined by
recursion over the terms and taking all the free first-order variables that occur
in formulas that are part of the terms so that for instance FV1(in1ϕ1∨ϕ2 M) =
FV1(ϕ1)∪FV1(ϕ2)∪FV1(M). At the same time there are naturally terms that
bind first-order variables, FV1(λXM) = FV1(M)\{X} and bring new free first-
order ones, e.g. FV1(MX) = FV(M) ∪ {X}.
Traditionally, the (cut) rule is not mentioned among standard rules in Fig. 1,
but as it is common in λ-calculi, it is included it in the system in the form
of a β-reduction rule. This rule forms the basic computation mechanism in the
stystem understood as a programming language. We omit the rules due to the
lack of space, but an interested reader can find them in the work of de Groote
[5]. Still, we want to focus our attention to terms in normal form (i.e. terms that
cannot be further reduced). Partly because the search for terms in such form is
easier and partly because source code of programs contains virtually exclusively
terms in normal form. The following theorem states that this simplification does
not make us lose any possible programs in our program synthesis approach.
Theorem 1 (Normalisation). First-order intuitionistic logic is strongly nor-
malisable i.e. each reduction has a finite number of steps.
The paper by de Groote contains also (implicitly) the following result.
Theorem 2 (Subject reduction). First-order intuitionistic logic has the sub-
ject reduction property, i.e. if Γ `M : φ and M →β∪p N then Γ ` N : φ.
As a consequence we obtain that each provable formula has a proof in normal
form. However, we need in our proofs a stricter notion of long normal form.
2.2 Long normal forms
We restrict our attention to terms which are in long normal form. The idea of
long normal form for our logic is best explained by the following example ([11],
section 5): suppose X : r and Y : r → p ∨ q. The long normal form of Y X is
case Y X of [a : p]λu. in1u, [b : q]λv. in2v.
Our definitions follow those of Urzyczyn, [11]. We classify normal forms into:
– introductions λX.N , λx.N , 〈N1, N2〉, in1N , in2N , pack N, y to ∃X.ϕ,
– proper eliminators X, PN , piiP , P (x),
– improper eliminators ⊥ϕ(P ), case P of [x : ϕ1]N1, [y : ϕ2]N2,
let x : ϕ be N : ∃X.ϕ in P
where P is a proper eliminator and N is a normal form. The long normal forms
(lnfs) are defined recursively with quasi-long proper eliminators:
– A quasi-long proper eliminator is a proper eliminator where all arguments
are of pseudo-atom type.1
– A constructor λX.N , 〈N1, N2〉, ∈i N , pack . . ., let . . . is a lnf when its argu-
ments are lnfs.
– A case-eliminator case P of [x : ϕ1]N1, [y : ϕ2]N2 is a lnf when N1 and N2
are lnfs and P is a quasi-long proper eliminator. A miracle (ex falso quodlibet)
⊥ϕ(P ) of a target type τ is a long normal form when P is a quasi-long proper
eliminator of type ϕ.
– A eliminator let x : ϕ be N : ∃X.ϕ in P is a lnf when N is a lnf and P is
a quasi-long proper eliminator.
The usefulnes of these forms results from the following proposition, [11].
Proposition 1 (Long normal forms). If Γ ` M : φ then there is a long
normal form N such that Γ ` N : φ.
1 Note that a variable is a quasi-long proper eliminator because all arguments is an
empty set in this case.
The design of automata that handle proof search in the first-order logic re-
quires us to find out what are the actual resources the proof search should work
with. We observe here that the proof search process—as it is the case of the
propositional intuitionistic logic—can be restricted to formulas that occur only
as subformulas in the initial formula. Of course this time we have to take into
account first-order variables. The following proposition, which we know how to
prove for long normal forms only, sets the observation in precise terms.
Proposition 2. Consider a derivation of ` M : ϕ such that M is in the long
normal form. Each judgement Γ ` N : ψ that occurs in this derivation has the
property that for each formula ξ in Γ and for ψ there is a subformula ξ′ of ϕ
such that ξ = ξ′[X1 := Y1, . . . , Xn := Yn] where FV(ξ′) = {X1, . . . , Xn} and
Y1, . . . , Yn are some first-order variables.
Proof. Induction over the size of the term N . The details are left to the reader.
uunionsq
We can generalise the property expressed in the proposition above and say
that a formula ψ emerged from ϕ when there is a subformula ψ0 of ϕ and
a substitution [X1 := Y1, . . . , Xn := Yn] with FV1(ψ0) = {X1, . . . , Xn} such
that ψ = ψ0[X1 := Y1, . . . , Xn := Yn]. We say that a context Γ emerged from ϕ
when for each its element x : ψ the formula ψ emerged from ϕ.
3 Arcadian Automata
Our Arcadian automaton2 A is defined as a tuple 〈A, Q, q0, ϕ0, I, i, fv〉, where
– A = 〈A,≤〉 is a finite tree, which formally describes a division of the au-
tomaton control into intercommunicating modules; the root of the tree is
written ε; since the tree is finite we have the relation ρ succ ρ′ when ρ ≤ ρ′
and there is no ρ′′ 6= ρ and ρ′′ 6= ρ′ such that ρ ≤ ρ′′ ≤ ρ′;
– Q is the set of states;
– q0 ∈ Q is the initial state of the automaton;
– ϕ0 ∈ A is the initial tree node of the automaton;
– I is the set of all instructions;
– i : Q → P(I) is a function which gives the set of instructions available in
a given state; the function i must be such that every instruction belongs to
exactly one state;
– fv : A → P (A) is a function that describes the binding, it has the property
that for each node v of A it holds that fv(v) =
⋃
w∈B fv(w) where B = {w |
v succ w}.
2 The name Arcadian automata stems from the fact that a slightly different and weaker
notion of Eden automata was developed before [8] to deal with the fragment of the
first-order intuitionistic logic with ∀ and → and in which the universal quantifier
occurs only on positive positions.
Each state may be either existential or universal and belongs to an element
a ∈ A, so Q = Q∃ ∪ Q∀, and Q∀ = ⋃a∈AQ∀a and Q∃ = ⋃a∈AQ∃a. The set of
states Q is divided into two disjoint sets Q∀ and Q∃ of, respectively, universal
and existential states.
Operational semantics of the automaton. An instantaneous description (ID) of
A is a tuple 〈q, κ, w,w′, S, V 〉 where
– q ∈ Q is the current state,
– κ is the current node in A,
– w : A ⇀ V is an interpretation of bindings associated with κ by fv(κ), in
particular we require here that fv(κ) ⊆ dom(w),
– w′ : A ⇀ V is an auxiliary interpretation of bindings that can be stored in
this register location of the ID to help implement some operations,
– S is a set called store, which contains pairs 〈ρ, v〉 where ρ ∈ A and v : A ⇀ V ,
we require here that fv(ρ) ⊆ dom(v),
– V is the working domain of the automaton.
The initial ID is 〈q0, ϕ0, ∅, ∅, ∅, ∅〉.
Intuitively speaking the automaton works as a device which discovers the
knowledge accumulated in the tree A. It can find new items of interest in the
domain of the discourse and these are stored in the set V while the facts concern-
ing the elements of V are stored in S. Traditionally, the control of the automaton
is represented by the current state q, which belongs to a module indicated by
κ. We can imagine the automaton as a device that tries to check if a particular
piece of information encoded in the tree A is correct. In this view the piece of
information, which is being checked for correctness at a given point, is repre-
sented by the current node κ combined with its interpretation of bindings w.
The interpretation of bindings w′ is used to temporarily hold an interpretation
of some bindings.
We have 7 kinds of instructions in our automata. We give here their oper-
ational semantics. Let us assume that we are in a current ID 〈q, κ, w,w′, S, V 〉.
The operation of the instructions is defined as follows, where we assume q′ ∈ Q,
ρ, ρ′ ∈ A.
1. q : store ρ, ρ′q′ turns the current ID into
〈q′, ρ′, w, ∅, S ∪ {〈ρ, (w′ ⊕ w)|fv(ρ)〉}, V 〉,
2. q : jmp ρ, q′ turns the current ID into 〈q′, ρ, w′′, ∅, S, V 〉, where
(w′ ⊕ w)|fv(κ) ⊆ w′′ and fv(ρ) ⊆ dom(w′′),
3. q : new ρ, q′ turns the current ID into 〈q′, ρ, w, ∅, S, V ∪{X}〉, where X 6∈ V ,
4. q : check ρ, ρ′, q′ turns the current ID into 〈q, ρ′, w, ∅, S, V 〉, the instruction
is applicable only when an additional condition is met that there is a pair
〈ρ, v〉 ∈ S such that v(ρ) = w(κ),
5. q : instL ρ, ρ′, q′ turns the current ID into 〈q′, ρ′, w, ∅, S ∪ {〈ρ, w′′|fv(ρ)〉}, V ∪
{X}〉, the instruction is applicable only when an additional condition is met
that there is a node ρ′′ ∈ A such that ρ′′ succ ρ and w′′ = ([ρ′′ := X]⊕w′)⊕w
and X 6∈ V ,
Structural decomposition instructions
(1) ϕ1 → ϕ2 q∀ϕ1→ϕ2 : store ϕ1, ϕ2, q∃ϕ2
⇒〈q∀ϕ1→ϕ2 , ϕ1→ϕ2, w, ∅, S, V 〉→〈q∃ϕ2 , ϕ2, w, ∅, S ∪ {〈ϕ1, w|fv(ϕ1)〉}, V 〉
(2) ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 q∀ϕ1∧ϕ2 : jmp ϕ1, q∃ϕ1
⇒ 〈q∀ϕ1∧ϕ2 , ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2, w, ∅, S, V 〉 → 〈q∃ϕ1 , ϕ1, w, ∅, S, V 〉
q∀ϕ1∧ϕ2 : jmp ϕ2, q
∃
ϕ2
⇒ 〈q∀ϕ1∧ϕ2 , ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2, w, ∅, S, V 〉 → 〈q∃ϕ2 , ϕ2, w, ∅, S, V 〉
(3) ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 q∃ϕ1∨ϕ2 : jmp ϕ1, q∃ϕ1
⇒ 〈q∃ϕ1∨ϕ2 , ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2, w, ∅, S, V 〉 → 〈q∃ϕ1 , ϕ1, w, ∅, S, V 〉
q∃ϕ1∨ϕ2 : jmp ϕ2, q
∃
ϕ2
⇒ 〈q∀ϕ1∨ϕ2 , ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2, w, ∅, S, V 〉 → 〈q∃ϕ2 , ϕ2, w, ∅, S, V 〉
(4) ∀X.ϕ q∀∀X.ϕ : new ϕ, q∃ϕ
⇒ 〈q∀∀X.ϕ,∀X.ϕ,w, ∅, S, V 〉 → 〈q∃ϕ, ϕ, [∀X.ϕ := Y ]⊕ w, ∅, S, V ∪ {Y }〉
where Y 6∈ V
(5) ∃X.ϕ q∀∃X.ϕ : instR ϕ, q∃ϕ
⇒ 〈q∀∃X.ϕ,∃X.ϕ,w, ∅, S, V 〉→〈q∃ϕ, ϕ, [∃X.ϕ := Y ]⊕ w|fv(∃X.ϕ), ∅, S, V 〉
where Y ∈ V
Fig. 2. Structural decomposition instructions of the automaton
6. q : instR ρ, q′ turns the current ID into 〈q′, ρ, w′′, ∅, S, V 〉, the instruction
is applicable only when an additional condition is met that κ succ ρ and
w′′ = [γ := X]⊕ w|fv(ρ), where γ ∈ fv(ρ)\fv(κ), and X ∈ V ,
7. q : load ρ, q′ turns the current ID into 〈q′, ρ, w′′, v, S, V 〉, where
(w′ ⊕ w)|fv(κ) ⊆ w′′ and fv(ρ) ⊆ dom(w′′), and v : A ⇀ V .
These instructions abstract the basic operations associated with the process of
proving in predicate logic. Observe that the content of the additional register
loaded by the instruction load can be used only for the immediately following
instruction as all the other instructions erase the content of the register.
It is also interesting to observe that the set of instructions contains in addition
to standard assembly-like instructions two instructions instL , instR that deal
with pattern instantiation.
The following notion of acceptance is defined inductively. We say that the
automaton A eventually accepts from an ID a = 〈q, κ, w,w′, S, V 〉 when
– q is universal and there are no instructions available in state q (i.e. i(q) = ∅,
such states are called accepting states), or
– q is universal and, for each instruction i available in q, the automaton started
in an ID a′ eventually accepts, where a′ is obtained from a by executing i,
– if q is existential and, for some instruction i available in state q the automa-
ton started in an ID a′ eventually accepts, where a′ is obtained from a by
executing i.
The definition above actually defines inductively a certain kind of tree, the
nodes of which are IDs and children of a node are determined by the configura-
tions obtained by executing of available instructions. Actually, we can view the
process described above not only as a process of reaching acceptance, but also
as a process of recognising of the tree. In this light the automaton is eventually
accepting from an initial configuration if the language of its ‘runs’ is not empty.
As a result we can talk about the acceptance of such automata by referring to
the emptiness problem.
Here is a basic monotonicity property of the automata.
Proposition 3. If the automaton A eventually accepts from 〈q, κ, w,w′, S, V 〉
and w ⊆ w′′ then the automaton A eventually accepts from 〈q, κ, w′′, w′, S, V 〉.
Proof. Induction over the definition of the configuration from which automaton
eventually accepts. The details are left to the reader. uunionsq
3.1 From formulas to automata
We can now define an Arcadian automaton Aϕ = 〈A, Q, q∃ϕ, ϕ, I, i, fv〉 that corre-
sponds to provability of the formula ϕ. For technical reasons we assume that the
formula is closed. This restriction is not essential since the provability of a for-
mula with free variables is equivalent to the provability of its universal closure.
The components of the automaton are as follows.
– A = 〈A,≤〉 is the syntax tree of the formula ϕ.
– Q = {q∀ψ, q∃ψ, q∀ψ,∨, q∀ψ,→, q∀ψ,∃, q∀ψ,⊥ | for all subformulas ψ of ϕ}. The states
annotated with the superscript ∀ belong to Q∀ while the states with the
superscript ∃ belong to Q∃.
– q∃ϕ is the initial state (which means the goal of the proving process is ϕ).
– The initial state and initial tree node are q∃ϕ and ϕ, respectively.
– I and i are presented in Fig. 2 and 3. We describe them in more detail below.
– fv : A→ P (A) is defined so that fv(ψ) = {bindϕ(ψ,X) | X ∈ FV(ψ)}.
Fig. 2 and 3 present the patterns of possible instructions in I. Each of the
instruction patterns starts with a state of the form qOψ or of the form q
O
ψ,• where
O is a quantifier (∀ or ∃), ψ is a subformula of ϕ and • is one of the symbols
∨,→,⊥,∃. For each of the patterns we assume I contains all the instructions
that result from instantiating the pattern with all possible subformulas that
match the form of ψ (e.g. in case ψ = ψ1 → ψ2 we take all the subformulas with
→ as the main symbol). The function i : Q→ P (I) is defined so that for a state
qQψ it returns all the instructions which start with the state. In addition to the
instructions they present the way a configuration is transformed by each of the
instructions. This serves to facilitate understanding the proofs.
Non-structural instructions
(6) q∃ϕ : jmp ϕ, q
∀
ϕ
⇒ 〈q∃ϕ, ϕ, w, ∅, S, V 〉 → 〈q∀ϕ, ϕ, w, ∅, S, V 〉
(7) q∃ϕi : jmp ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2, q∃ϕ1∧ϕ2 for i = 1, 2
⇒ 〈q∃ϕ, ϕ, w, ∅, S, V 〉 → 〈q∀ϕ1∧ϕ2,∧, ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2, w′′, ∅, S, V 〉
(8) q∃ϕ : load ϕ, q
∀
ϕ,∨
⇒ 〈q∃ϕ, ϕ, w, ∅, S, V 〉 → 〈q∀ϕ,∨, ϕ, w,w′, S, V 〉
(9) q∃ϕ : jmp ϕ, q
∀
ϕ,→
⇒ 〈q∃ϕ, ϕ, w, ∅, S, V 〉 → 〈q∀ϕ,→, ϕ, wˆ, ∅, S, V 〉 where w ⊆ wˆ
(10) q∃ϕ : jmp ∀X.ϕ, q∃∀X.ϕ
⇒ 〈q∃ϕ, ϕ, w, ∅, S, V 〉 → 〈q∃∀X.ϕ, ∀X.ϕ,w, ∅, S, V 〉
(11) q∃ϕ : load ϕ, q
∀
ϕ,∃
⇒ 〈q∃ϕ, ϕ, w, ∅, S, V 〉 → 〈q∀ϕ,∃, ϕ, wˆ, w′, S, V 〉
(12) q∃ϕ : jmp ϕ, q
∀
ϕ,⊥
⇒ 〈q∃ϕ, ϕ, w, ∅, S, V 〉 → 〈q∀ϕ,⊥, ϕ, w, ∅, S, V 〉
(13) q∃ϕ : check ϕ,ϕ, q
∀
axiom
⇒ 〈q∃ϕ, ϕ, w, ∅, S, V 〉 → 〈q∃ϕ, ϕ, w, ∅, S, V 〉
(14) q∀ϕ,∨ : jmp ψ1 ∨ ψ2, q∃ψ1∨ψ2
⇒ 〈q∀ϕ,∨, ϕ, w,w′, S, V 〉 → 〈q∃ψ1∨ψ2 , ψ1 ∨ ψ2, w′, ∅, S, V 〉
(15) q∀ϕ,∨ : store ψ1, ϕ, q
∃
ϕ
⇒ 〈q∀ϕ,∨, ϕ, w,w′, S, V 〉 → 〈q∃ϕ, ϕ, w′, ∅, S′, V 〉
where S′ = S ∪ {〈ψ1, w′|fv(ψ1)〉}
(16) q∀ϕ,∨ : store ψ2, ϕ, q
∃
ϕ
⇒ 〈q∀ϕ,∨, ϕ, w,w′, S, V 〉 → 〈q∃ϕ, ϕ, w′, ∅, S′, V 〉
where S′ = S ∪ {〈ψ2, w′|fv(ψ2)〉}
(15) and (16) should be instantiated with ψ1 and ψ2’s which were used in (14).
(17) q∀ϕ,→ : jmp ψ → ϕ, q∃ψ→ϕ
⇒ 〈q∀ϕ,→, ϕ, w, ∅, S, V 〉 → 〈q∃ψ→ϕ, ψ → ϕ,w, ∅, S, V 〉
(18) q∀ϕ,→ : jmp ψ, q
∃
ψ
⇒ 〈q∀ϕ,→, ϕ, w, ∅, S, V 〉 → 〈q∃ψ, ψ, w, ∅, S, V 〉
(18) should be instantiated with ψ and ϕ’s which were used in (17).
(19) q∀ϕ,∃ : jmp ∃X.ψ, q∃∃X.ψ
⇒ 〈q∀ϕ,∃, ϕ, w,w′, S, V 〉 → 〈q∃∃X.ψ, ∃X.ψ,w′, ∅, S′, V 〉
(20) q∀ϕ,∃ : instL ψ,ϕ, q
∃
ϕ
⇒ 〈q∀ϕ,∃, ϕ, w,w′, S, V 〉 → 〈q∃ϕ, ϕ, w, ∅, S′, V 〉
where w′′ = ([∃X.ψ := X]⊕ w′)⊕ w, S′ = S ∪ {〈ψ,w′′|fv(ψ)〉}
(19) should be instantiated with ψ and ϕ’s which were used in (20).
(21) q∀ϕ,⊥ : jmp ⊥, q∃⊥
⇒ 〈q∀ϕ,⊥, ϕ, w, ∅, S, V 〉 → 〈q∀ϕ,⊥,⊥, w, ∅, S, V 〉
Fig. 3. Non-structural instructions of the automaton
As the figure suggests, the instructions of the automaton can be divided into
two groups—structural decomposition instructions and non-structural ones.
The structural instructions are used to decompose a formula into its structural
subformulas. On the left-hand side of each of the structural instructions we
present the formula the instruction decomposes. The other rules represent oper-
ations that manipulate other elements of configuration with possible change of
the goal formula, see example below for illustration.
Example. Consider the formula ϕ = ∀x(P (x)) → ∀y∃xP (x). In order to build
the Arcadian automaton for that formula first we have to build the tree A of it,
which is shown in Fig. 4. →
∀x
P (x)
∀y
∃x
P (x)
1
2
3
4
5
6
Fig. 4. Syntax tree of the for-
mula.
The instructions available (I) are:
(1) q∀1 : store 2, 4, q∃4 (19) q∀1,∃ : jmp 5, q
∃
5
(4) q∀2 : new 3, q∃3 (19) q∀4,∃ : jmp 5, q
∃
5
(4) q∀4 : new 5, q∃5 (19) q∀5,∃ : jmp 5, q
∃
5
(5) q∀5 : instR 6, q∃6 (20) q
∀
1,∃ : instL 5, 1, q
∃
1
(10) q∃3 : jmp 2, q∃2 (20) q∀4,∃ : instL 5, 4, q
∃
4
(10) q∃6 : jmp 2, q
∃
2 (20) q∀5,∃ : instL 5, 5, q
∃
5
the instructions available for any a ∈ A are
(6) q∃a : jmp a, q∀a (8) q∃a : load a, q∀a,∨ (9) q∃a : jmp a, q∀a,→
(11) q∃a : load a, q∀a,∃ (12) q
∃
a : jmp a, q
∀
a,⊥ (13) q
∃
a : check a, a, q
∀
axiom
(21) q∀a,→ : jmp ⊥, q∃⊥
The set of states can be easily written using the definition. To calculate fv
we need to calculate binds first. We have bind1(3, x) = 2 and bind1(6, x) = 5;
therefore fv(3) = {2}, fv(6) = {5} and fv(otherwise) = ∅. q0 = q∃1 and ϕ0 = ϕ.
The initial ID is q = q∃1 , κ = 1, and the other elements of the description are
empty sets. A successful run of the automaton is as follows: jmp 1, q∀1 (rule (6),
initial instruction leads to the structural decomposition of the main connective
→); store 2, 4, q∃4 (r. (1), as the result of the decomposition, the formula at the
node 2 is moved to the context, and the formula at 4 becomes the proof goal);
jmp 4, q∀4 (r. (6), we progress to the structural decomposition of ∀); new 5, q∃5
(r. (4), we introduce fresh eigenvariable, say X1, for the universal quantifier);
jmp 5, q∀5 (r. (6), we progress to the structural decomposition of ∃); instR 6, q∃6 (r.
(5), we produce a witness for the existential quantifier, which can be just X1);
jmp 2, q∃2 (r. (10), we progress now with the non-structural rule that handles
instantiation of the universal assumption from the node 2); and now we can
conclude with check 2, 2, qaxiom (r. (13)) that directly leads to acceptance.
From derivability questions to IDs A proof search process in the style of Ben-
Yelles [1] works by solving derivability questions of the form Γ `? : ψ. We
relate this style of proof search to our automata model by a translation of such
a question into an ID of the automaton. Suppose that the initial closed formula is
ϕ. We define the configuration of Aϕ that corresponds to Γ `? : ψ by exploiting
the conclusion of Proposition 2. This proposition makes it possible to associate
a substitution wψ with ψ and wξ with each assignment x : ξ ∈ Γ . The resulting
configuration is aΓ,ψ = 〈q∃ψ0 , ψ0, wψ, ∅, SΓ,ψ, VΓ,ψ〉 where SΓ,ψ = {〈ξ, ψξ〉 | x :
ξ ∈ Γ} and VΓ,ψ = FV1(Γ, ψ) as well as wψ(ψ0) = ψ.
Lemma 1. If Γ ` M : ψ is derivable and such that Γ and ψ emerged from ϕ
then Aϕ eventually accepts from the configuration 〈q∃ψ0 , ψ0, wψ, ∅, SΓ,ψ, VΓ,ψ〉.
Proof. We may assume that M is in the long normal form. The proof is by
induction over the derivation ofM . We give here only the most interesting cases.
If the last rule is (var), we can apply the instruction (13) that checks if the
formula wψ(ψ0) is in SΓ,ψ. Then the resulting state q∀axiom is an accepting state.
If the last rule is the (∧I) rule then ψ = ψ1 ∧ψ2 and we have shorter deriva-
tions for Γ `M1 : ψ1 and Γ `M2 : ψ2, which by induction hypothesis give that
Aϕ eventually accepts from the configurations 〈q∃ψi0 , ψi0, wψi , ∅, SΓ,ψi , VΓ,ψi〉. for
i = 1, 2 where we note that wψi = wψ, SΓ,ψi = SΓ,ψ and VΓ,ψi = VΓ,ψ. We can
now use the rule (6) to turn the existential state q∃ψ into the universal one q
∀
ψ
for which there are two instructions available in (2), and these turn the current
configuration into the corresponding above mentioned ones.
If the last rule is the (∧Ei) rule for i = 1, 2 then we know that ψ = ψi for
one of i = 1, 2 and Γ ` M ′ : ψ1 ∧ ψ2 is derivable through a shorter deriva-
tion, which means by the induction hypothesis that Aϕ eventually accepts from
the configuration 〈q∃ψ1∧ψ2 , ψ1 ∧ψ2, wψ1∧ψ2 , ∅, SΓ,ψ1∧ψ2 , VΓ,ψ1∧ψ2〉 where actually
wψ1∧ψ2 |fv(ψi) ⊆ wψi and fv(ψi) ⊆ dom(wψ1∧ψ2) for both i = 1, 2. Moreover,
SΓ,ψ1∧ψ2 = SΓ,ψ and VΓ,ψ1∧ψ2 = VΓ,ψ. This configuration can be obtained from
the current one using respective instruction presented at (7).
If the last rule is the (→ E) rule then we have shorter derivations for Γ `M1 :
ψ′ → ψ and Γ ` M2 : ψ′. The induction hypothesis gives that Aϕ eventually
accepts from the configurations
〈q∃ψ′0→ψ0 , ψ
′
0 → ψ0, wψ′→ψ, ∅, SΓ,ψ′→ψ, VΓ,ψ′→ψ〉,
〈q∃ψ′0 , ψ
′
0, wψ′ , ∅, SΓ,ψ′ , VΓ,ψ′〉.
Note that actually SΓ,ψ′→ψ = SΓ,ψ and VΓ,ψ′→ψ = VΓ,ψ. We can now use the
instruction (9) to turn the current configuration into
〈q∀ψ0,→, ψ0, wψ′→ψ, ∅, SΓ,ψ, VΓ,ψ〉,
which can be turned into the desired two configurations with the instructions
(17) and (18) respectively.
If the last rule is the (∀I) rule then ψ = ∀X.ψ1 and we have a shorter
derivation for Γ ` M1 : ψ1 (where X is a fresh variable by the eigenvariable
condition), which by the induction hypothesis gives that Aϕ eventually accepts
from the configuration
〈q∃ψ10 , ψ10, wψ1 , ∅, SΓ,ψ1 , VΓ,ψ1〉,
where wψ1(ψ10) = ψ1, SΓ,ψ1 = SΓ,ψ and VΓ,ψ1 = VΓ,ψ ∪ {X}.
We observe now that the instruction (6) transforms the current configuration
to 〈q∀∀X.ψ10 , ψ, wψ, ∅, SΓ,ψ, VΓ,ψ〉 and then the new instruction from (4) adds
appropriate element to VΓ,ψ and turns the configuration into the awaited one.
If the last rule is the (∃E) rule then we know that Γ ` M1 : ∃X.ψ1 and
Γ, x : ψ1 ` M2 : ψ are derivable through shorter derivations, which means by
the induction hypothesis that Aϕ eventually accepts from configurations
〈q∃∃X.ψ01 ,∃X.ψ01, w∃X.ψ1 , ∅, SΓ,∃X.ψ1 , VΓ,∃X.ψ1〉,
〈q∃ψ0 , ψ0, wψ, ∅, SΓ ′,ψ, VΓ ′,ψ〉
(1)
where w∃X.ψ1(∃X.ψ01) = ∃X.ψ1, wψ(ψ0) = ψ and Γ ′ = Γ, x : ψ1, which conse-
quently means that SΓ ′,ψ = SΓ,ψ ∪ {〈ψ01, w′〉} and VΓ ′,ψ = VΓ,ψ ∪ {X} where
w′ = [∃X.ψ01 := X] ⊕ w∃X.ψ1 |fv(ψ01). Note that x is a fresh proof variable by
definition and X is a fresh variable by the eigenvariable condition.
We observe that the current configuration can be transformed to
〈q∀ψ0,∃, ψ0, wψ, w∃X.ψ1 , SΓ,ψ, VΓ,ψ〉
by the instruction (11). This in turn is transformed to the configurations (1) by
instructions (19) and (20) respectively. uunionsq
We need a proof in the other direction. To express the statement of the next
lemma we need the notation ΓS for a context x1 : w1(ψ1), . . . , xn : wn(ψn) where
S = {〈ψ1, w1〉, . . . , 〈ψn, wn〉}.
Lemma 2. If Aϕ eventually accepts from the configuration 〈q∃ψ, ψ, w, ∅, S, V 〉
then there is a proof term M such that ΓS `M : w(ψ).
Proof. The proof is by induction over the definition of the eventually accepting
configuration by cases depending on the currently available instructions. Note
that only instructions (3), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13) are available
for states of the form q∃φ.
We can immediately see that if one of the instructions (3) from Fig. 2 is
used then the induction hypothesis applied to resulting configurations brings
the assumption of the respective rule (∨Ii) for i = 1, 2 and we can apply it to
obtain the conclusion.
Then taking the instruction (6) moves control to one of the instructions
present in Fig. 2 and these move control to configurations from which the in-
duction hypothesis gives the assumptions of the introduction rules (→ I), (∧I),
(∀I), (∃I) respectively.
Next taking the instructions (8), (9), (11), (12) move control to further non-
structural rules in Fig. 3 and these move control to configurations from which
the induction hypothesis gives the assumptions of the elimination rules (∨E),
(→ E), (∃E), and (⊥E). At the same time the instructions (7), (10), move
control directly to configurations from which the induction hypothesis gives the
assumptions of the elimination rules (∧E), (∀E).
At last the instruction (13) directly represents the use of the (var) rule.
More details of the reasoning can be observed by referring to relevant parts
in the proof of Lemma 1 and adapting them to the current situation. uunionsq
Theorem 3 (Main theorem). The provability in intuitionistic first-order logic
is equivalent to the emptiness problem for Arcadian automata.
Proof. Let ϕ be a formula of the first-order intuitionistic logic. The emptiness
problem for Aϕ is equivalent to checking if the initial configuration of this Ar-
cadian automaton is eventually accepting. This in turn is by Lemma 1 and
Lemma 2 equivalent to derivability of ` ϕ. uunionsq
4 Conclusions
We proposed a notion of automata that can simulate search for proofs in normal
form in the full first-order intuitionistic logic, which can be viewed by the Curry-
Howard isomorphism as a program synthesis for a simple functional language.
This notion enables the possibility to apply automata theoretic techniques to
inhabitant search in this type system. Although the emptiness problem for such
automata is undecidable (as the logic is, [9]), the notion brings a new perspective
to the proof search process which can reveal new classes of formulae for which
the proof search can be made decidable. In particular this automata, together
with earlier investigations [8,9], bring to the attention that decidable procedures
must constrain the growth of the subset V in ID of automata presented here.
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